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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

MONROC, INC,, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent ,
vs.

No. 87-0164

M. TIMMIE SIDWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Did the lower court err in concluding that defendant

Timmie Sidwell was not entitled to additional compensation while
she worked as a security guard at the Monroe Cottonwood Plant?
PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
1.

29 U.S.C. §206 states the followir^g:

(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his
employees who in any work week . . . is employed in an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, wages at the following rates:
(1) . . . not less than $3.35 an hour after
December 31, 1980. . . .
2.

29 U.S.C. §207 states the following:

(a)(2) No employer shall employ any of his
employees who in any work week (1) is employed in an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce . . . (c) for a work week longer
than forty hours after the expiration of the fourth
year from [the effective date of the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1961], unless such employee
-1-

receives compensation for his employment in excess of
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.
3.

29 U.S.C. §216(b) states the following:

Any employer who violates the provisions of §206
or §207 of this title shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation,
as the case may be, and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages . . . the court in such action
shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the
plaintiff . . ., allow a reasonable attorneys fee to
be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.
In addition to these specific statutes a number of federal
regulations enacted by the U.S. Department of Labor are also
relevant to this appeal:
29 C.F.R. §785.14 provides:
Whether waiting time is time worked under the Act
depends upon particular circumstances. The
determination involves "scrutiny and construction of
the agreements between particular parties, appraisal of
their practical construction of the working agreement
by conduct, consideration of the nature of the service,
and its relation to the waiting time, and all of the
circumstances. Facts may show that the employee was
engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be
engaged." Such questions "must be determined in
accordance with common sense and the general concept of
work or employment." (Citations omitted).
29 C.F.R. §785.20 states:
Under certain conditions an employee is considered
to be working even though some of his time is spent in
sleeping or in certain other activities.
29 C.F.R. §785.21 provides:
An employee who is required to be on duty for less
than twenty-four hours is working even though he is
permitted to sleep or engage in other personal
activities when not busy. A telephone operator, for
example, who is required to be on duty for specified
-2-

hours is working even though she is permitted to sleep
when not busy answering calls. It makes no difference
that she is furnished facilities for sleeping- Her
time is given to her employer. She is required to be
on duty and the time is work time.
29 C.F.R. §785.22 provides:
(a) General. Where an employee is required to be
on duty for twenty-four hors or more, the employer and
the employee may agree to exclude bona fide meal
periods and a bona fide regularly scheduled sleeping
period of not more than eight hours from hours worked,
provided adequate sleeping facilities are furnished by
the employer and the employee can usually enjoy an
interrputed night's sleep. If sleeping period is of
more than eight hours, only eight hours will be
credited. Where no express or implied agreement to the
contrary is present, the eight hours of sleeping time
and lunch period constitutes hours worked.
29 C.F.R. §785.23 provides:
An employee who resides on his employer's premises
on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is
not considered as working all the time he is on the
premises. Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private
pursuits and thus have enough time for eating,
sleeping, entertaining, and other periods of complete
freedom from all duties when he may leave the premises
for purposes of his own. It is, of course, difficult
to determine the exact hours worked under this
circumstance and any reasonable agreement of the
parties which takes into consideration all of the
pertinent facts will be accepted.
29 C.F.R. §516.1 through 516.10 provides:
Every employer shall maintain and preserve payroll
or other records containing information and data
showing, among other things, the regular hourly rate of
pay; the hours worked each work day ar^d the total hours
worked each work week; the total daily or weekly
straight time earnings or wages and ai^y additions or
deductions from wages paid during each pay period; and
the total wages paid each pay period.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE!
A.

Nature of the Case

This action was originally commenced by Plaintiff Monroe,
-3-

Inc. as an unlawful detainer suit seeKing to evict Defendant from
the Monroe Cottonwood Plant premises.

Defendant counterclaimed

alleging a violation of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act as to
the wages she was paid during the approximate four years she
worked for Monroe.
B.

Proceedings Below

This case was tried to the Honorable Scott Daniels on March 2
and March 3, 1987.

At the conclusion of the testimony Judge

Daniels rendered his opinion in favor of plaintiff Monroe in the
amount of $300 for its unlawful detainer claim and in favor of
Monroe, Inc. and against Defendant as to Defendant's Counterclaim
of federal wage law violations.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were
subsequently entered by the lower court on March 20, 1987.

A copy

of these Findings and Judgment is attached herein as part of the
appendix to this Brief.
Defendant Sidwell appealed from the denial of any
compensation for alleged violation of the federal wage laws.
Plaintiff Monroe cross-appealed on the basis that the lower court
should have trebled the damages awarded to it.
C.

Statement of Facts

The general facts in this case are essentially undisputed.
The main area of controversy concerns the scope of Defendant's
work with Monroe, Inc. as well as the legal interpretation of the
applicable statutes and regulations to this work.
It was stipulated by the parties that Monroe is an enterprise

-4-

engaged in interstate commerce and has been so engaged at least
since 1982-

It has a yearly gross sales of at least $250,000

since 1982-

It is, therefore, an enterprise subject to the

minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C.

§201 (Tr.

Vol.

I, p. 23)|.

The Monroe Cottonwood Plant is located on 190 acres.
Approximately 150 acres of this is fenced.

(Tr.

Vol I, p. 78).

Buildings are centrally located around a large pit.

Approximately

20 acres contain the majority of the buildings and is where the
operation occurs.

(Tr.

Vol.

I, p.

79). In 1982 Monroe was

aware of its responsibility to comply with the Fair Labor
Standards Act and to pay an hourly minimum wage of $3.35 in
applicable cases.

(Tr.

Vol.

I, p. 113).

In 1976 two boys sneaked onto the Monroe property, fell
through the ice, and drowned.

From that time on Monroe elected to

hire a security person for the Cottonwood facility.

(Tr. Vol.

I, p. 38) .
In 1982 Dean Adams who had been the prior security guard
indicated he wished to move to other endeavors.

An ad was put in

the newspaper which stated that Monroe wanted a part-time security
guard who would live on the premises and who would provide their
own mobile home.

(Tr.

applied for the job.

Vol.

I, p.

138). Defendant Sidwell

She interviewed with Mr. Bruce Squires who

at that time was the division manager of all the plants and with
Mr. Darrell Williams who at that time was the foreman of the
Cottonwood facility.

Since a major portion of this appeal focuses

-5-

upon the agreement reached by the parties as to the scope of
Defendant's work, the testimony of Squires, Williams, and the
defendant relating to this initial employment agreement will now
be examined.
Bruce Squires stated that when Mrs. Sidwell contacted him he
told her to go talk to Darrell Williams who was the foreman of the
Cottonwood Heights plant.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 138). She came back

several hours later and said that Darrell had hired her.
point he signed her up on the payroll.

At that

(Id. at 139).

Mr. Squires stated that Defendant was told that Monroe wanted
her continual presence on the property.

Monroe wanted someone

coming and going so there would be tire tracks in the snow on the
weekends and the kids would know that somebody was around.

He

stated he did not expect her to be there at all times on the
weekend.

He stated that he told Mrs. Sidwell that she was free to

come and go as she pleased.

He recalled telling her that if

she was going to be gone for a couple of days they would like to
know so they could call the sheriff's department and have them
patrol the property while she was gone.
141-42).

(Tr. Vol.

I, pp.

Mr. Squires stated that in his view of the agreement she

had no responsibilities whenever anyone else was on the property.
(Tr. Vol.

I, p. 143).

It was his original understanding that she could live there
and was entitled to leave at night whenever she wanted to.

He did

not want to hire somebody, however, who was always going to be
away and her semi-retired life-style appealed to him because he

-6-

assumed she would be present most of the time.

(Id. at 144).

Mrs. Sidwell was instructed to make "rounds" at various times
to inspect the property.

Squires admitted it was possible she

would make those rounds even though other people were present.
(Id. at 146). He was mostly concerned during her employment to
have her presence on the property and to make sure she checked the
gates to be sure they were locked at night.

(Id. at 147).

Mr. Squires examined Exhibit D-l which is entitled "Job
Description—Security Guard".

While he could not recall

specifically going over it with Mrs. Sidwell he assumed he did
since his handwriting appears on it.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 149-150).

During the tenure of Mrs. Sidwell1s employment Mr. Squires
would occasionally come to the property at various times.

He

sometimes would come early in the mornings and other times in the
afternoons.

Most of the time she was there.

During one period of

time Mr. Squires stated that he specifically asked Timmie to turn
off pumps at 2:00 and 4:00 in the morning and she said she would
gladly do it and actually performed this t^sk.

(Id. at 153).

Darrell Williams was the plant foreman at that time.

He

interviewed Mrs. Sidwell and outlined the job description as well
as the type of individual they were seeking.

He states that

Exhibit 1 is the job description that he gave to her.

This was

given to her shortly after she was hired in early 1982.

(Id.

at 156-57).
He told her that she was hired as a deterrent to vandalism.
She was expected to show her presence and to make sure all the
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gates were locked.

(Id. at 158). Mr. Williams acknowledged that

Mrs. Sidwell was supposed to be present on the property and was
required to physically live there.

(Id. at 167). He informed

Mrs. Sidwell that her job was to insure that after operation hours
had ceased she was to make sure the property was secure and that
no kids were playing on it.
on weekends and holidays.

She was also expected to make rounds
(Tr.Vol.

II, pp.

21-23).

Mr. Williams never told Defendant that she had to remain
awake during the night to be on guard.

He stated that she was

free to come and go other than the required rounds on the
weekends.

She was free to leave between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.

during the week and had no responsibilities during that period of
time at all.

After 5:00 p.nu she was responsible to see that

small children did not come on the premises.

He never instructed

Mrs. Sidwell that her duties terminated when the sun went down.
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 27-32).
Defendant Sidwell testified that during her initial inquiry
she visited with Darrell Williams to determine what the exact
duties would be if she chose to live on the Monroe property.

She

stated she took detailed notes as he explained what would be
expected.

According to Sidwell, Williams told her that she would

be expected to be present on the property every night but that she
should not be afraid because there would be a night crew present.
He told her that although the night crew would be working in the
back pit she would be expected to be present after the plant
closed at 5:00.

(Tr.Vol.

II, p.
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39). She was told as to the

nighttime duty on the weekdays that she coqld pretty well live her
own life but that she would have to make certain rounds late in
the evening-

This could include turning pumps on and off in the

middle of the night after the night crew had gone.

(Id. at 40).

Mr. Williams also explained that Monroe expected her to be on
the property every weekend and every holiday while the plant was
not in operation.

He told her that weekends started at 11:45 on

Saturday at which time she would be expected to close the top gate
on the south.

After the plant closed and the machinery had

stopped running she was to close the bottom gate every Saturday at
noon.

This was to occur whether or not there was a maintenance

crew on the site.

(Id. at 41). Mr. Williams told her that on

Sundays she was to make rounds three times a day (Id. at 43).
Williams told her that she was to be on the lookout for
trespassers at all times even when she was not making her rounds.
She was responsible for making sure all the buildings were locked
during the periods that the plant was not ^n operation.

(Id.

at p. 44). Were she to see any trespassers she was not to
confront them in a violent manner but was to ask them their
business and to take any license plate numbers down when
applicable and report them to the police.

(Id.).

During these conversations she told Williams that she would
have to have time during the weekend to go to the grocery store
and sometimes to church.

She also told him that she might want to

go to the symphony or to the theater.

She stated that Mr.

Williams said this would be perfectly fine as long as she would
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let them know.

In that event she was to make sure the gates were

locked before she left and to lock the gate behind her when she
left and to make another round when she returned.

(Id. at 45).

She was also told that on very windy nights she was to get up and
to go over to the cement plant and make sure that the pilot light
of the boiler was still functioning.

(Id. at 47).

After beginning her employment she was given the "Job
Description—Security Guard" Exhibit 1 (contained herein in the
Appendix) by Mr. Williams.

He told her that this was her formal

job description and added that she was also required to check the
boilers during windy days which was not contained in the exhibit.
He again told her that during the daylight hours from 7:00 in the
morning until 5:00 at night she was not responsible for anything
occurring at the plant and that she could obtain a daytime job if
she so desired.

(Id. at 58) .

It was defendant Sidwell's contention that under the terms of
the agreement she was required to be present in her mobile home or
on the property generally each weeknight after 5:00 p.m. when the
plant had ceased operation.

In addition, she was required to be

on the premises from 12:00 p.m. Saturday until 7:00 a.m. Monday of
each weekend as well as to be on the premises during any holiday.
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181-83).
Between 1982 and 1986 she worked under several different
foremans.
Vasey.

These included Darrell Williams, Ken Bartel and Jan

Mrs. Sidwell maintained that as the years progressed she

was given more and more responsibilities from the original
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agreement.

These included controlling the level of the back lake,

making more active "rounds", and working at additional times.
(Defendants Exhibit 6 ) .
After several incidents of vandalism had occurred Mrs.
Sidwell was asked to submit her recommendations as to how to
improve the security at the Monroe plant.

On January 21, 1986 she

submitted three documents to the management of Monroe concerning
her proposals for additional security including additional
compensation for her services.

One document was a history of her

experiences at the Monroe plant including the various duties she
had been assigned throughout the years as well as an explanation
as to certain events that had occurred.

(Defendant's Exhibit 6 ) .

A second document submitted on this date was entitled "Some
Informal Thoughts About Revised Security Guard Schedule".

This

document essentially made various proposals and suggestions as to
how the security could be improved at the site.

In addition, Mrs.

Sidwell called various security companies to obtain rates for
protection of these facilities.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 11).

The final document submitted on Januarly 24, 1986 was entitled
"Analysis: Estimated Dollar Value of My Present Total Work Hours."
This document analyzed various levels of security from the level
being provided at the time to suggested increased levels.

In this

document Mrs. Sidwell makes various proposals for increased wages
for increased service.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). All three of

these documents are contained as part of tfye Appendix herein.
Subsequently, a letter was sent to defendant Sidwell dated
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January 28, 1986 which terminated her services in the security
function at the Cottonwood Heights plant.

(Exhibit P-14)•

A copy

of which is contained in the Appendix herein.
On April 25, 1986 a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
against Defendant alleging that her employment terminated on March
31, 1986 but that she refused to move from the premises.
4-5).

(R.

On May 5, 1986 an Answer and Counterclaim was filed

alleging that Monroe had breached its contract by terminating her
services wrongfully since she should have been allowed to continue
employment until the gravel pit had been closed.

(R.

8-10).

On August 27, 1986, after a new attorney had been retained,
an Amended Counterclaim was filed on behalf of Defendant.

In this

Counterclaim Defendant for the first time asserted her claim of
inadequate wages under the Federal Fair Labor Standard Act.

(R.

48-54).
As previously noted, Judgment was rendered on behalf of
plaintiff Monroe and against Defendant as to both the Complaint
and Counterclaim.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court erred in denying any benefits to Defendant
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

First, the court erred in

concluding that Defendant was not required as a condition of her
employment to essentially be present on the property during
certain periods of time during the week.

This finding is without

adequate evidentiary support and is clearly erroneous.
Second, the lower court incorrectly applied the principles of

-12-

federal employment law to the facts of this case.

The court

concluded that because Defendant had opportunity to engage in
personal activities during her presence on Plaintiff's property
that she automatically was not entitled to any claim of benefits.
Under federal law, an analysis must be made of each case and there
is no automatic exclusion merely because of personal activities.
ARGUMENT
Since this case was tried to the lower court, sitting without
a jury, certain elementary principles of appellate review apply.
First, the Findings of Fact must provide a basis for determining
whether there is a rational basis for the court's decision.
Proper Findings are essential to enable an appellate court to
perform its function of assuring that the Findings support the
Judgment and that the evidence supports the Findings.

Romrell

v. Zions Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
Next, an appellate court does not accord any deference to the
Conclusions of Law of the trial court sitting without a jury in
reviewing such Conclusions of Law for correctness.

An appellate

court is as capable of determining a question of law as is the
trial court and therefore is not bound by its conclusions.

Wessel

v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985).
i
i

Findings of Fact that are conclusions bf law are treated as
such on appeal and will stand only if there are other Findings of
Fact sufficient to support them.

Town Concrete Pipe of

Washington, Inc. v. Redford, 717 P.2d 1384 (Wash. App. 1986).
An appellate court must give great weight to the findings
-13-

made and the inference drawn by the trial judge but it must reject
his findings if it considers them to be clearly erroneous,

A

finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Adair v.

Bracken, 70 Utah Adv.

Rpt.

39 (Ct.

App.

11-24-87).

Applying these principles to the following case requires
reversal.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION FOR HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE
PLAINTIFF.
The lower court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law made several erroneous findings.

The erroneous Findings of

Fact are as follows:
Finding No. 7: Plaintiff and Defendant agreed
that Defendant would reside on the premises, although
it was not a condition of her employment that she be
present on the premises on a full-time basis or
during any certain times (except to perform some
of her specific duties, the timing of some of which
assignments was freely altered by Defendant from time
to time).
Finding No. 10: Defendant was free to come and go
as she wished, and was free to pursue her own
individual interests during the time she was employed
by Plaintiff and to use her time effectively for her
own purposes to do such things as eat, sleep, go
shopping, do personal errands, study, write,
occasionally attend church and the symphony, accept
full-time employment during the day, and with the prior
permission of the plaintiff (which was freely given and
never denied) take evening classes at the University of
Utah and on one occasion for two or three months accept
full-time employment which extended until approximately
9:00 p.m. on weekdays, and engage in other normal
private pursuits.
-14-

Finding No. 11: Defendant's actual duties under
the agreement with Plaintiff approximated no more than
eight to ten hours per week for which she was paid by
Plaintiff at rates in excess of the minimum wage
required under the FLSA; and the other times when
Defendant was living on the premises did not constitute
hours which were controlled by the plaintiff or its
business.
Findings of Fact, Record, p. 195-196.

(Emphasis added).

Defendant would dispute the following Conclusions of Law
entered by the court:
Conclusion 4: Under 29 C.F.R. §785.23, because
Defendant in this case was not working all the time she
was on the plaintiff's premises, and because Defendant
was free to engage in normal private pursuits and had
time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and other
periods of complete freedom from all duties when she
was free to come and go for purposes of her own,
Defendant's actual hours at work did not exceed the
number which, when her compensation was taken into
account, would have constituted a violation of the
minimum wage or overtime provision of the FLSA.
Conclusion 5: Plaintiff did not violate the terms
of the FLSA with respect to the minimum wage and
overtime requirements of said Act.
Conclusion 6: Defendant is not entitled under the
FLSA to be paid for those times which she was able to
use effectively for her own purposes and during which
she was free to come and go as she pleased and was free
to pursue her own personal interests.
Conclusion 7: Defendant is not entitled to any
further compensation from Plaintiff either under the
minimum wage provision or the overtime provisions of
the FLSA.
Conclusions of Law, R. 197-198.

(Emphasis added).

These Findings and Conclusions are erroneous for the
following two reasons.

First, the clear weight of the evidence

shows that Defendant Sidwell was in fact required to be physically
present at the property during certain specified hours during the
-15-

week.

Second, while during those hours she was free to engage in

personal activity at the jobsite her mere presence on the property
was a benefit to Monroe and, in addition, she performed services
as needed throughout the night and weekend.

Federal law permits

compensation under these circumstances.
A.

Defendant Sidwell was Required to be on
Plaintiff's Property During Certain Specified
Hours of Each Week.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff Monroe is subject to the Fair
Labor Standards Act because it is engaged in interstate commerce
and because it has a yearly gross sales of at least $250,000.

It

is also uncontested that regardless the type of agreement entered
into between Plaintiff and Defendant in February of 1982, such
agreement cannot change the requirements of the Federal Labor law.
(Tr.

Vol.

I, p.

29). An agreement between an employer and an

employee which is in violation of the federal wage laws is of no
force and effect and cannot constitute a waiver.

Mitchell v.

Turner, 286 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.

§785.8.

1960); 29 C.F.R.

In determining whether hours are compensable it is the duty
of a court to look to the employment agreement to determine what
the parties intended, and where that is impossible to look to the
circumstances to determine what was intended.
Swift & Co., 232 U.S.

See, Skidmore v.

134 (1944); Rural Fire Protection Co.

Hepp, 366 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.

1966).

arrangement upon the parties.

v.

"The law does not impose an

It imposes upon the courts the task

of finding what the arrangement was." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 326
U.S. at 137.
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The United States Supreme Court in Skidmore made other
pertinent observations-

The court noted, for example, that often

parties to an employment arrangement do not anticipate the
problems which arise from lack of clear definition of employment
duties•

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated:

We do not minimize the difficulty of such an
inquiry where the arrangements of the parties have not
contemplated the problem posed by the statute- But it
does not differ in nature or in the standards to guide
judgment from that which frequently confronts courts
where they must find retrospectively %he effect of
contracts as to matters which the parties failed to
anticipate or explicitly to provide f6r. Id- at
137.
With these principles in mind it now remains to examine the
facts of this case.
At the time the employment arrangement was entered into by
the parties, neither contemplated a claim under the Federal Labor
Standard Act.

Mrs. Sidwell was content with her compensation of

$350 a month and Monroe was content with its explanation of
services to be rendered.

Had the parties contemplated this type

of an action undoubtedly additional steps would have been taken by
one, the other, or both to clarify the actual working arrangementThis failure to clarify, however, has absolutely no effect upon
the application of the federal statute to the circumstances of
this case.
It is undisputed that at the time the arrangement was entered
into Mrs. Sidwell would have certain responsibilities.
was required to live at the Monroe Cement felant site-

First, she
Second, she

was required to perform certain specified junctions such as
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checking and locking gates and making "rounds" during certain
periods of time to insure the safety of the property.

Third, Mrs.

Sidwell was paid a monthly wage of $355 with no attempt made by
Monroe to maintain any computation of hours actually worked.
It is also essentially undisputed that the "active" time
spent by Mrs. Sidwell in her patrolling, locking of gates, and
writing reports encompassed approximately eight hours a week.
(Exhibit 12). Thus, were the only question in this case whether
Monroe had compensated Mrs. Sidwell for her active work under the
Federal guidelines there would be no question but that it had.
The dispute in this litigation, therefore, focuses upon the
claim of Mrs. Sidwell that not only did she have certain "active"
duties to perform each day but that she was also "passively"
required to be present at the site during specified periods of
time.

Defendant asserted that she was required by Monroe to be

physically present at the property during the weekday nights after
the operation of the plant had ceased.

In addition, she was

required to be physically present at the site on Saturday from
12:00 until 7:00 Monday morning.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181-83).

She

claimed that while she was permitted to leave the premises for
certain short periods of time with prior permission of Monroe that
she was not free to leave the premises for any activities she
desired.
Monroe, on the other hand, asserted that there was no set
requirement that she be present at the property during any certain
number of hours and that she essentially was free to come and go
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as she wanted at any time.

The lower courtt accepted this version

of the facts and found, as previously noted, that there was no set
requirement of her presence.
Appellant submits that the conclusion of the lower court is
erroneous when the entire record is examined in detail.

A review

of the record is as follows.
First, Mrs. Sidwell testified that wt^en she met with Darrell
Williams during the initial job interview he told her that she
would be expected to be present on the property every night.

(Tr.

Vol. II, p. 39). He also informed her that she would be expected
to be on the property during the weekends and during holidays.
(Id. at 41) .
At that time she informed him that she may have to go to the
grocery store, to church, and to the symphony and that she could
not guarantee she would always be present during every hour of
these periods of time.

She stated that Mr. Williams said this was

perfectly fine as long as she contacted Monroe officials and
informed them that she would be absent for a short period.

(Id.

at 45). This account was directly denied by Mr. Williams, a
present Monroe employee, who stated he never told her she was
restricted from leaving the premises at an^ time.

(Tr.

Vol.

I,

p. 243).
All things being equal, therefore, the lower court could
choose to believe Mr. Williams' testimony and discard the
testimony of Mrs. Sidwell.

Under Williams* version she was free

to do whatever she wanted whenever she wanted as long as she
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performed certain minimal duties such as locking the gates and
making a round of the premises.

However, if that was the case

then why was it necessary for her to periodically discuss with him
her absence to go to church, run errands, attend the symphony, and
the theater.
Mr. Stanton Wilson who is the vice president of Monroe
testified that it was his understanding from the original
agreement that Mrs. Sidwell would be allowed to attend church on
Sunday morning, that she could go to the symphony occasionally if
she so desired, and that she would have further leeway for theater
activities.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 52-54).

This testimony emphasizes

the patent inconsistency to approve specific activities of Mris
Sidwell if in fact she was always free to do anything she chose.
Next, is the job description which was given to Mrs. Sidwell.
Mr. Squires who was then the district manager stated that at some
time immediately after hiring her he reviewed the job description
of a security guard with her and even wrote additional comments on
it. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 156-57; Exhibit 1 ) . Darrell Williams, the
foreman at the jobsite, also acknowledged that he went over the
job description with her at the time she was hired.

Finally, Mrs.

Sidwell stated that she was given the job description contained in
Exhibit 1 and told that this was her responsibility.

(Tr. Vol.

II, pp. 55-57) .
Exhibit 1 states that the responsibility of a security guard
is:
Security and prevention of vandalism to buildings,
plants, equipment, supplies and property. He is
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directly responsible after operating hours of each
division, weekends and holidays (except designated days
off). (Exhibit 1 ) .
While an attempt was made by Monroe during the trial to imply
that "operating hours" are when the last person of the maintenance
crew left for the night the clear substance of the evidence showed
that operating hours were when the plant closed for its normal
operation regardless of whether a maintenance crew was still on
the premises.

Mr, Williams, for example, stated that the plant

was in operation from 7:00 in the morning until 5:00 or 6:00 at
night.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 159). He stated that the plant could only

operate during these hours since people who lived around the area
would otherwise complain about the noise.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 14).

Likewise, Jan Vasey who was the third foreman who supervised
Defendant, testified that the plant normally shut down at 5:00
p.m. and would open at 7:00 a.m.
around noon.

On Saturday, it would shut down

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 258).

Mr. Williams, also supported Defendant's contention that she
was required to be present on the property after 5:00 p.m.

He

stated that Mrs. Sidwell was free to leave the premises and to do
whatever she wanted between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and had no
responsibilities during that period of time|.

However, after 5:00

p.m. she was responsible to see that small children did not come
on the premises.

(Tr.

Vol.

I, p. 30).

Additional evidence supports Defendant's version of the
requirement of the job.

Mrs. Sidwell testified that Doug Clark,

one of the top management officials of Monroe, drove out to see
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her in the summer of 1984.

At that time she stated Mr. Clark

stressed the fact that her responsibility was to definitely be
present at nights and on weekends.

(Tr.

Vol.

II, p.

64). Mr.

Clark was not called as a witness by Monroe to refute this
statement.
The two most compelling reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's
claim that Defendant was free to come and go at her leisure are
(1) the testimony of Jan Vasey stating that she frequently called
him for permission to leave; and (2) her own report to the company
in January of 1986 prior to any time she was asserting a claim for
additional wages.
If, as stated by Plaintiff Mrs. Sidwell was free to come and
go as she wanted and only had certain specified duties which could
be performed virtually at any time why was it necessary for her to
contact the foremen and inform them of her absence.

Mr. Vasey

answered the following questions posed to him by Defendant's
attorney:
Q.

Did Mrs. Sidwell occasionally call you to ask
to be absent from the premises of Monroe?

A.

Yes, she did.

Q.

Did you keep any records of those?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Can you tell me how often she called you to be
off the premises?

A.

Not very often.

Q.

Okay. Do you remember the type of time off she
would ask for?

A.

Usually a couple of hours here, a couple of hours
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there.
Q.

Was that generally approved?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did she ask for permission to attend school?

A.

Yes, she did.

Q.

Did you give her that permission?

A.

Yes I did.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 260).
The court was obviously concerned abo^t his inconsistency and
therefore asked several questions of Mr. Vasey.

The dialogue

between the court and Mr. Vasey is as follows:
THE COURT: I have a question, Mr. Vasey. You say that
occassionally she would call you and ask if she could
take time off, like to go to school and so forth?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE COURT: Well, didn't that seem odd to you if she
didn't have to, if she could be there any time anyway,
she wasn't required to be there any particular time?
THE WITNESS: I don't understand what you are trying to
say.
THE COURT: Well, did you expect her to be there any
certain hours?
THE WITNESS:

No, I did not.

THE COURT: Well, why did she call to ^sk if she could
go to school?
THE WITNESS: I guess she figured she needed the
permission to go.
THE COURT:

And--* * *

THE COURT: Well, didn't you say anything to her, like,
why are you calling me? What difference does it make?
You can do whatever you want.
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THE WITNESS:

No, I did not.

THE COURT: Like what did you say when she would ask you
these things?
THE WITNESS: I would just tell her she was free to go.
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 264-65).
It seems inconceivable that a foreman such as Mr. Vasey would
merely humor the defendant by giving her permission to go away
from the premises if such permission was not in fact required.
This conduct, if for no other reason, would certainly give rise to
Defendant's claim that she sincerely believed she was required to
stay on the premises after operating hours unless she expressly
obtained permissionto leave for specific reasons.
It is elementary that the conduct of the parties to a
contract is substantial evidence as to the meaning of that
contract.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 232 U.S.

134 (1944).

This

admission by Plaintiff's employee that he "gave permission" for
Defendant to leave, together with the prior statements of Mr.
Stanton Wilson that the parties contemplated she could leave for
certain specified reasons such as school, the symphony, and church
completely negates the conclusion that she was always free to go
wherever she wanted at any time.
On January 24 Mrs. Sidwell submitted three documents to the
management of Monroe at a time when tensions had been created over
her claim that she was not receiving sufficient compensation for
the work she was doing and Monroe's claim that she was not
properly performing her duties.

At this time Mrs. Sidwell was

clearly not aware of any federal wage guidelines and was not
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attempting to document this litigation sinqe she had not even been
terminated by Monroe.

Rather, her attempt was to work out an

arrangement where she would receive what she believed to be fair
compensation for her efforts and to increase the security
arrangements of the plant.
Exhibit 6 succinctly describes the agreement she entered into
in February of 1982.

She stated:

Because of a recent case of vandalism, I want to
put before you a history of my functions at Monroe
since February 8, 1982. I was hired by Darrell
Williams to perform the following functions:
(1) To be here nights and weekends, and
holidays (Christmas, Labor Day, etc.) with
weekends specified by Darrell as Saturday
afternoons only, and all day Sunday.
(2)

To lock gates.

(3) To keep a lookout for trespassers
and to make the following rounds at weekends:
MORNINGS, possible NOONS, and EVENINGS, on
Sundays, holidays and only when hight crews
or Monroe personnel were not on location.
In Exhibit 12, her "analysis of estimated dollar value of her
present total work hours," she again described her present job
description.

She broke each function of heir job into categories

as follows:
Category
of the week.

(A): To be present on location each night

Category (B): To be present on location (1)
Saturday afternoons (or whenever men are not working,
and no one is there); (2) all day Sunday; (3) on
specified holidays.
Category (C): To lock the gates each night, first
checking that everyone has left the plant.
Category

(D): To make rounds three times per day,
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maximum, on days designated in (B) above. To evict
trespassers and to make reports on the activity to the
plant foreman after any incidents.
Category (E): Presumption: that the guard lives on
premises.
Defendant then concluded that during each week she was
passively located on the property for 104-1/2 hours.

(Exhibit 12,

p. 2 ) . The active work requiring to lock the gates, make the
rounds, and make reports she calculated at 7 hours and 50
minutes.
She then stated the following which now supports her
contention she was required to be physically on the premises.
This type of analysis is useless unless the
alternatives are kept well in mind: in my case, the
alternative presented is that, as an autonomous human
being, I maintain the choice to be away from home some
nights, sometimes overnight and some weekends; to go to
the mountains some Sundays.
When I took on the job of security guard, I was
aware that this would be curtailed, and I made the
choices accordingly. However, for this very reason, it
is presumed that my presence on location has some
financial value, even at times when I am not physically
working, or making rounds.
(Exhibit 12, pp. 2-3).
The finding by the lower court that Defendant was not
required to be present on the site during the evenings and
weekends but was free to come and go as she pleased is clearly
erroneous.

Although there is evidence to support it (the

assertions of the Monroe employees during trial) a review of the
entire record together with the actions of the parties shows with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
This Court, therefore, based upon the record should find that as
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part of Defendant's job responsibilities stie was required to
remain on the premises after operating hours unless she obtained
prior approval of Monroe to leave.
B.

The Lower Court Incorrectly Applied Federal
Wage Law to the Facts of this Ca4e.

The court concluded that because the defendant was "not
working all the time that she was on the plaintiff's premises" and
"because she was free to engage in normal private pursuits" and
was "free to come and go for purposes of h$r own" she was not
subject to the FSLA requirement of minimum wages.
Defendant readily admits that the application of federal wage
law to situations such as this is difficulty at best.

Where an

employee goes to an employer's job site and works in actual
physical labor for a specified period of time and then leaves the
job site for the day, there is no difficulty in applying the wage
laws to benefits that employee is entitled to receive.

When, on

the other hand, an employee lives on the working site or does not
physically perform work during an entire period of time that he is
present, the situation becomes much more complex.
29 C.F.R. §785.7 relates to judicial Construction of these
type of cases.

Essentially this regulation relates that the

United States Supreme Court originally held that employees subject
to the Act must be paid for all time spent in "physical or mental
exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of
the employer or his business." Tennessee Cqal, Iron and
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
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The regulation notes, however, that later the Court ruled
that there need be no exertion at all and that all hours are hours
worked which the employee is required to give his employer, that
"an employee, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to
do nothing but wait for something to happen,.

Refraining from

other activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve,
and idleness plays a part in all employments in a stand-by
capacity.

Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as

service itself, and time spent lying in wait for threats to the
safety of the employer's property may be treated by the parties as
a benefit to the employer." [Armour & Co.

v. Wantock, 323

U.S. 126 (1944); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)].
Whether waiting time is time worked depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case.

This determination

involves "scrutiny and construction of the agreement between
particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of
the working agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of
the service, and its relation to the waiting time and all of the
circumstances.

Facts may show that the employee was engaged to

wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged." Skidmore
v- Swift, 323 U.S. 134 at 137.
29 C.F.R. §785.16 again attempts to give guidelines in
determining whether waiting time is or is not compensable.
states:
Periods during which an employee is completely
relieved from duty and which are long enough to enable
him to use the time effectively for his own purposes
are not hours worked. He is not completely relieved
-28-

It

from duty and cannot use the time effectively for his
own purposes unless he is definitely told in advance
that he may leave the job and that he will not have to
commence work until a definitely specified hour has
arrived. Whether the time is long enough to enable him
to use the time effectively for his own purposes
depends upon all the facts and circum$tances of the
case.
29 C.F.R. §785.17 concerns employees Who are "on call".

It

states:
An employee who is required to remain on call on
the employerfs premises or so close thereto that he
cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes is
working while "on call". An employee who is not
required to remain on the employer's premises but is
merely required to leave word at his home or with
company officials where he may be reached is not
working while on call. [Armour & Co. v. Wantock,
323 U.S. 126 (1944); Handler v. Thrasher, 191 F.2d
120 (C.A. 10, 1951); Walling v. Bank of Waynesboro,
Georgia, 61 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ga. 1945)].
The preceding discussions concern the concept of "waiting
time".

Appellant asserted that Mrs. Sidwell was required to stay

on the property in order that vandalism ma^f be deterred and, in
addition, to perform certain functions wherj. required such as
turning on pumps or operating other types of machinery.

It is

unnecessary at this point in the proceedings to detail the
evidence to support her claim that she frequently was asked by
telephone to perform functions at the plant during the
non-operating hours.

Since the lower court did not address the

concept of waiting time and made no findings to that effect a
remand is required to determine whether Defendant's mere presence
at the jobsite or her ability to perform operational functions at
the plant could be considered compensable time under the Act.
The court addressed its decision solely upon 29 C.F.R.
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§785.23 which is entitled "Employees Residing on Employer's
Premises or Working at Home."

This regulation acknowledges that

an employee who resides on the premises cannot make a claim for
all time there and that those times in which the person engages in
normal activities in which there is "complete freedom from all
duties when he may leave the premises for purposes of his own" are
not compensable.

The regulation continues by noting that it is

difficult to determine these hours and that any "reasonable
agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all the
pertinent facts will be accepted."
Defendant Sidwell maintained that she was free to do whatever
she wanted from 7:00 in the morning until 5:00 p.m. each weeknight
and from 7:00 a.m. until 12:00 noon on Saturday.
claim for these periods.

She made no

After this period, however, she asserted

that she was required to be physically present at the site unless
she had been excused for a specific activity.
The lower court rejected this contention and, as previously
noted, found that she could leave at any time during each 24-hour
period.

Based upon this finding it concluded that none of the

time in which she resided on the premises was compensable since
she had "complete freedom from all duties" and could "leave the
premises for purposes of her own."
Since the lower court based its conclusion on an erroneous
factual finding it did not properly analyze the question.

Section

785.23 must be considered with §785.21 and §785.22 which concern
duty of less than 24 hours and duty of 24 hours or more.
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Under

these regulations, it is quite clear that sleep time can be work
time.

For periods of less than 24 hours the rule is that sleep

time is work time.

For 24 hour periods, there must be an

agreement and the employer must furnish sleeping facilities.
more than eight hours can be excluded.

No

If there is no agreement

the eight hours must be included as hours forked.
In situations where an employee resides on the employer's
property the courts have gone in both directions as to granting or
denying compensation.

For example, in Witt v. Skelly Oil

Co., 379 P.2d 61 (N.M. 1963) a utility man occupied a residence
on his employer's premises and his duties required him to remain
available on the premises during weekends.

The court held he was

entitled to be compensated for all hours which he spent in a
stand-by status except for those hours devoted to eating and
sleeping and performing personal work.
In Crago v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 301 F. Supp.

743 (D.

Tenn.

1969) the plaintiff was employed as a caretaker of a test station
facility and was hired to remain on the premises.

The court in

that case apportioned a segment of the hours as working time and
rejected the rest.

The court stated:

Although plaintiff was a captive on defendant's
premises for sixteen unpaid hours of the day, we think
that it would be unreasonable to hold that all, or
most, of that time was time worked for purposes of the
Act. Eight of those hours were spent by plaintiff
sleeping and two were spent eating. Also, plaintiff
had a wife and children who lived with him on the
premises.
In our opinion, three of the remaining six hours
of the day were spent by plaintiff in pursuit of purely
personal matters as distinguished from the performance
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of his duty to act as caretaker of defendant's test
station.
Although plaintiff spent only a brief period in
overtime each day in actual physical labor, such as
turning lights on and off, this fact is not controlling
as to the determination of the hours worked by
plaintiff for purposes of the Fair Labor Standard Act.
We find that, in the circumstances of this case,
plaintiff was hired to serve and to be ready to serve
and that he did so serve for eleven hours a day. Since
he was paid for only eight of those hours he must be
compensated for the other three under the terms of the
Act. IcL_ at 747.
In Whitsitt v. Enid Ice & Fuel Co., 6 CCH Lab Cas para.
61226 (D.

Okla.

1942) the court held that in as much as a night

watchman was employed to remain at the plant, all the hours
between the plant shutdown time and 6:00 a.m. were working hours,
even though he had the privilege of and was furnished facilities
for sleeping.
Respondent will undoubtedly be able to cite other cases to
the contrary which hold that such time is not compensable.
See, e.g.

Adkins v. Campbell, Brown & Co., 189 F. Supp.

553 (D. Va. 1960); Shupe v. Day, 113 F. Supp. 949 (D. Va.
1953) .

Each of these cases turns upon the peculiar facts and

circumstances of employment.

No sweeping generalizations can be

made.
In the instant case, the activities of Defendant during her
nighttime and weekend hours in which she was not actively
performing a duty was never examined.

Monroe maintained no

records whatsoever concerning Sidwell's employment.

As such, a

court must determine what wages are owing by reasonable inference
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from the facts presented.

In Marshall v. I^auta-Crete, Ltd.,

82 Labor Law Rpts. para. 33-589 (D. Va. 1977) two night watchmen
made a claim for overtime pay.

The court tiound that they were on

duty each weekend from Friday afternoon until Monday morning and
that their duties required them to lock the doors, check for
unusual noises, and to call the police if tihey heard anyone trying
to break in.

They were allowed to sleep ar}d a cot was provided

for them in the building.
Since there were no records of actual time consumed, the
court concluded that eight hours of the time was used in personal
pursuits such as eating and sleeping and that the remainder of the
time was attributable to the employer even though the watchmen
were essentially performing no physical activity.
There is no evidence in the record at this time as to what
Defendant did during these passive hours.

It may well be, for

example, that since she had the entire morning and afternoon with
no responsibilities whatsoever she may well have slept during
those days and stayed up at night working on her own projects as
well as being alert for trespassers or other occurrences at the
plant.

It cannot be assumed, therefore, that each night Mrs.

Sidwell would have consumed nine hours of sleep.
It is unnecessary to discus further the problems involved in
this trial.

Since the lower court determined as a factual finding

that Mrs. Sidwell was not required to be passively present at the
job site during the hours she claimed, the decision is fatally
flawed.

In a remand hearing the court can determine what benefit,
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if any, Monroe received from her presence at the site and can also
fairly determine the personal gain she received during these
periods of time which did not go to the advantage of Monroe.
Other questions, such as the good faith of Monroe in failing to
pay her the minimum wage can also be examined.

The award of

attorneys' fees and liquidated damages would then be determined
based upon these findings.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Sidwell worked at the Monroe plant for over four
years.

During this time she clearly performed valuable services

in the prevention of vandalism and in performing certain tasks
which were required for the operation such as lighting boilers and
turning on pumps.

It is unfortunate that a clear agreement was

not entered into between the parties at the time but, on the other
hand, this is not fatal.

The conduct of the parties including

their actions and their perceptions of the agreement must be
utilized in construing the terms of the agreement.
The evidence is overwhelming that Mrs. Sidwell was in fact
required to be present at the site during non-operating hours
unless she had been specifically given permission to leave for
certain activities.

The mere fact that the employer required her

to be there can give rise to a claim for compensation even if she
performed no duties whatsoever.

The loss of freedom and ability

to do one's own activities is compensable under certain
circumstances.
The lower court made no analysis of the waiting time, or
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on-call concepts of employment arrangements.

The court focused

entirely upon the section dealing with "residing employees".

The

court failed to make inquiries as to the activities Mrs. Sidwell
performed, to the benefit which her presence at the site created,
and to the detriment of Mrs. Sidwell in being unable to have the
freedom of movement.
An analogy is helpful here.

A person going on a two-week

vacation may choose to hire a "house sitter" to live in their
house during their absence.

The house sitter normally goes about

their own business and even gains benefits from being able to use
the facilities of the house.

Even so, the house sitter charges a

fee for this service since he is conferring a benefit on the owner
to protect the house.

Even if the house sitter attends a

two-hour play at night the benefit still exists because of the
presence of activity in the house.
She is entitled to a proper inquiry so that all of the facts
and circumstances giving rise to her employment may be properly
examined in light of the applicable standards of federal
employment law.
For this reason, therefore, the decision of the lower court
should be reversed and the case remanded.
Dated this 25th day of January, 1988.

JOMJA 3. UJ
Craig S/ /Cook
Attorney^for Appellant
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APPENDIX

W. Matthew Warnock (4939)
MANGUM & HOLT
Attorneys for Defendant
844 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
MONROC, INC.,
Plaintiff,

I

NOTICE OP APPEAL

vs.

Civil No. C-86-4757

TIMMIE M. SIDWELL,

i

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendant.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules
of Appelate Procedure, that the defendant M. Timmie Sidwell will
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court that portion of the final
Judgment entered on or about March 20, 1987 in the abovecaptioned court and case, which denied relief in defendant's
counterclaims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, together with
all Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L*w related thereto.
DATED this 17th day of April, 1987.

1

CERTIFICATE OF MAIM NO
On this 17th day of April, 198 , I deposited in the United
States Mall, postage prepaid a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal to:
John Paul Kennedy
1385 Yale Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
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MONROC, INC.,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

vs.
TIMMIE M. SIDWELL,
Defendant.

I
1

CIVIL NO. C 86 4757
JUDGE DANIELS

This matter came on for trial on March 2 and 3f 1987, with
the plaintiff represented by John Paul Kennedy and the defendant
represented by John R. Merkling and W. Matthew Warnock.

The

Court having heard the evidence submitted by the parties and
having considered the written and oral arguments of counsel, and
the Court having carefully considered the evidence and the law
applicable thereto, the Court now enters the following FINDINGS
OP FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff brought

this action pursuant

to the Utah

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Act, §§78-36-1 to 12.6, Utah
Code Annotated.

Defendant

answered

and asserted

by way of

counterclaim causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (hereinafter, the "FLSA").
2.

At the time of the commencement of the action herein,

plaintiff was a Delaware corporation doing business in Utah and
Idaho, with places of business in Salt Lake County, Utah, among
other places.
1

3.

Since at least January, 1982, plaintiff's yearly gross

sales has exceeded $250,000.
4.

Defendant, M. Timmie Sidwell, is an individual who was

employed by plaintiff as a security person at the plaintiff's
Cottonwood Heights sand and gravel location in Salt Lake County
from February 8, 1982, through March 31, 1986.
5.

When defendant was hired, the plaintiff and defendant

agreed that she would be paid $355 per month and would live in a
mobile home located on the premises in a space provided by the
plaintiff with utilities

(gas, electricity, water, and septic

tank) furnished by the employer as further consideration for her
services; it was understood that defendant would either rent or
buy the mobile home in which she lived.
6.
which

In addition to residing on the premises, the purpose of
was

to

provide

a

presence

to

discourage

and

deter

trespassers, defendant was also assigned certain specific duties
which included

ensuring

that the gates to the property were

locked, making one limited round each week-day and an additional
two rounds on weekends and holidays, preparing periodic reports,
and occasionally performing other minor miscellaneous functions
(including turning a pump switch on, and checking a pilot light
on windy days) if she were available to do so; defendant had no
other specific duties after daylight hours or when other Monroe
personnel were on the premises; other than her rounds, defendant
was not expected to keep any regular watch or surveillance over
the property but was merely asked to report any trespassing or
2

vandalism which should happen to come to her attention.
7.

Plaintiff and defendant agreed that defendant would

reside on the premises, although it was not a condition of her
employment that she be present on the premises on a full-time
basis or during any certain times (except to perform some of her
specific duties, the timing of some of which assignments was
freely altered by defendant from time to time).
8.

On one occasion when defendant was absent from the

premises for several days, she arranged at her own expense to
have a another person live in the mobile home while she was away,
but there was no showing that the duties of the other person were
any different from those of defendant during said period.
9.

On the occasion referred to in Finding 8, defendants

regular salary was paid without reduction.
10.

Defendant was free to come and go as she wished, and

was free to pursue her own individual interests during the time
she was employed by plaintiff and to use her time effectively for
her own purposes to do such things as eat, sleep, go shopping, do
personal errands, study, write, occasionally attend church and
the Symphony, accept full-time employment during the day, and,
with the prior permission of the plaintiff

(which was freely

given and never denied), take evening classes at the University
of Utah and on one occasion for two or three months accept fulltime employment which extended until approximately 9:00 p.m. on
week days, and engage in other normal private pursuits.
11.

Defendant's actual duties under the agreement with
3

plaintiff approximated no more than eight to ten hours per week
for which she was paid by plaintiff at rates in excess of the
minimum wage required under the FLSA; and the other times when
defendant was living on the premises did not constitute hours
which were controlled by the plaintiff or its business.
12.

Under all of the circumstances of this case, the

plaintiff paid the defendant for her hours of work at a rate
which at all times exceeded the minimum rate required by the
FLSA.
13.

Plaintiff

and

its representatives

did not act in

careless disregard of the minimum wage or overtime compensation
provisions of the FLSA and did not intentionally, knowingly, or
voluntarily take any action which violated the minimum wage or
overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA.
14.

Plaintiff's representatives acted in good faith without

being cognizant of any possible violation of the minimum wage or
overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA.
15.

Defendant's employment was terminated by notice dated

January 28, 1986, to be effective March 31, 1986, said notice
requesting that she vacate the premises by the end of March,
1986.
16.

When defendant failed to vacate by the stated date,

plaintiff caused that a notice to quit be served upon her which
was done on April 17, 1986.
17.

The complaint in this action was filed on April 25,

4

1986,

but

defendant's

mobile

home

was

not

removed

from

plaintiff's property until October 30, 198$.
18.

The damages thus incurred by plaintiff total $300.00,

computed by

multiplying

the reasonable rental value of the

mobile home space (which the Court finds, after considering all
the evidence, to be $50.00 per month) times six months.
19.

Plaintiff offered evidence that in addition to the

reasonable rental value of the mobile home space, the average
monthly value of utilities provided for defendant were gas: $30;
electricity: $25; water $8; and sewer: $10.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is an enterprise doing business in interstate

commerce and subject to the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the FLSA.
2.

The plaintiff lawfully terminated the employment of the

defendant.
3.

The credible evidence offered at trial fails to prove

any cause of action against plaintiff regarding defendant's FLSA
claims and other claims as asserted in her amended counterclaim.
4.

Under 29 C.F.R. §785.23, because defendant in this case

was not working all the time she was on the plaintiff's premises,
and because

defendant

was

free to engage

in normal private

pursuits and had time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and
other periods of complete freedom from all duties when she was
free to come and go for purposes of her own, defendant's actual
5

hours

of

work

did

not

exceed

the

number

which,

when

her

compensation was taken into account, would have constituted a
violation of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the PLSA.
5.

Plaintiff did not violate the terms of the FLSA with

respect to the minimum wage and overtime requirements of said
act.
6.

Defendant is not entitled under the FLSA to be paid for

those times which she was able to use effectively for her own
purposes and during which she was free to come and go as she
pleased and was free to pursue her own personal interests.
7.

Defendant is not entitled to any further compensation

from plaintiff either under the minimum wage provisions or the
overtime provisions of the FLSA.
8.

Plaintiff

is entitled

to a judgment dismissing all

counts of the amended counterclaim.
9.

The plaintiff is not entitled under the Utah Forcible

Entry and Unlawful Detainer Act to have its damages trebled.
10.

The defendant is liable to plaintiff for the damage

incurred by plaintiff

as a result of defendant's

failure to

remove her mobile home after the notice to quit was served.
11.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

a

judgment

against

the

defendant in the amount of $300.00 plus interest from September
30, 1986, plus costs of suit.
Dated:

Scott Daniels, District Judge
6

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MONROC, INC.,
Plaintiff,

]
;
JUDGMENT

vs.
\
1

TIMMIE M. SIDWELL,
Defendant.

CIVIL NO. C 86 4757
JUDGE DANIELS

The Court having entered FINDINGS OP FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW in this action, and based upon those FINDINGS and CONCLUSIONS
now enters the following JUDGMENT:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

Judgment

is entered

in favor of plaintiff and

against

defendant in the amount of $300.00.
2.

Judgment

is entered

in favor of plaintiff and against

defendant on each count of the defendant's counterclaim, and said
counterclaim

is hereby dismissed with prejudice with no cause of

action.
3.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount of this

Judgment at the prejudgment rate from September 30, 1986, to the
date hereof, and at the post-judgment rate hereafter.
4.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

recover

from

defendant

all

costs of suit expended by plaintiff in this action.
Dated:

Scott Daniels, District Judge
7

Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment
Approved as to form:

2'****?
Paul Kennedy _
prney for Plaintiff

John Re Merkling and
W, Matthew Warnock,
Attorneys for Defendant
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.WB DFSr.RIPTION - SECURITY GUARDS
I.

BASIC FUNCTION
Monroe's Security Guards are responsible for security of Monroe's
designated properties.

II.

AUTHORITY

Security Guards derive their authority from and are responsible to
sand and gravel division manager or his designated subordinates.
III. RESPONSIBILITY
1. Security and prevention of vandalism to buildings, plants,
equipment, supplies and property. He is directly responsible after operating hours of each division, weekends and holidays (except designated days off).
2. He will challenge anyone entering properties during the above
mentioned hours. He will reoort any attempted vandalism
or theft of property to designated persons listed at end of
job description.
3. No one is to be allowed on properties unless by satisfactory
identification or authority or by previous arrangement from
Monroe's management or suoervisors'.
4. He will record on quard loo book those persons without proper
or questionable authority desiring entrance to oroperties.
Log should show following:
a. Name of individual
b.

Reason for entrance

c. Car license number
d. Time in and time out
5. Under no condition will he physically try to remove any person
from said properties. He will call for assistance from Sheriff's
Department.
6. He will not carry any arms, knives, etc., wheh challenqing anyone.
His sole responsibility will be to contact Police and Sheriff's
Department when conditions arise that require their assistance.
7. He will be responsible for reportinq fires, electrical explosions,
etc., to County fire departments and designated Monroe persons. He
will take necessary efforts to prevent soreadinn of fire or "further
damage until arrival of Fire Department

- 2 -

8. Children w i l l not be allowed on property, or playing on equipment,
sand and gravel banks or wading, swimming i n any water areas.
9. When additional time o f f i s required (emergencies, e t c . ) he w i l l
request same from designated subordinates. A l l additional time
o f f should be approved before leaving property.
10. No equipment, t o o l s , t i r e s , e t c . , w i l l be allowed to be removed
from property without p r i o r w r i t t e n clearance from Monroe's
supervisors.
11.

S u f f i c i e n t inspections should be made during the previous mentioned hours and days to observe and check s e c u r i t y of b u i l d i n g s ,
equipment and p r o p e r t i e s .

12. A l l personal grievances or complaints should be reported to sand
and gravel d i v i s i o n manager.

Douglas R. r/lark - Sand and Gravel Manager - 2 7 7 - 0 ^
Area supervisors and subordinates: Leon VanDyke - Cottonwood Heights Plant
Ready Mix

- 266-7264

«X\ C v

Jtrtvx

; :•:

<JV/? ^J

Boiler - Kearns - Russ CoMins - 272-2056
B o i l e r - Cottonv/ood Heights - Tage Lanng - 484-1265
Any other problems ready mix related c a l l :
Ken Baird - 277-5478
Keith Rudy - 363-4077
Robert Gudmundsen - 277-4491 r
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IM!PORfAMD PHONE NUMBERS:

«

FIRE DEPARTMENT .
SHERIFF'S OFFICE
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January 24, 1986,
first drafted and
submitted January
21 , 1986, for Mr.
Stan Wilson and Mr.
Jann Vasey.
TO:

Stan Wilson,
Jann Vasey

FROM: M. Sidwell, Security Guard.
Monroe, Cottonwood.

Because of a recent case of vandalism, I Want to put before you a
history of my functions at Monroe since February 8, 1982.
I was hired by Darrell Willams to perform the following functions:
(i) To be here, nights and week-ends? and holidays (Xmas, Labor Day etc
witTT~WEEK-ENDS specified by Darrell as Saturday afternoons only,
and all day Sunday.
(i i)

To lock gates

(iii) To keep a look-out for trespassers and to make the following
rounds at»week-ends: MORNINGS, possible NOONS, and EVENINGS,
on Sundays, holidays and only when men, night-crews or Monroe
personnel were not on location.

I came to work for Monroe under the above conditions.
-

2
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When Darrell moved elsewhere, and I was under Ken Bartel, my duties
increased as follows:
(1) Ken would have me turn off pump at back lake, and this was
any time between 12 midnight and 3:00 a.m.
(2) Most of the time Ken did not communicate with me, and screamed
abuses at me when I had not consistently turned off the pumps
even though it was understood I would not do so unless instructed.
(3) Ken subjected me to the most extreme abuse, which was very
and about which, I complained to Mr.- Robert Parry.

disturbinc

For no given, reason, just about this time, I was made responsible for
watching the level of the back lake!!! Once again this was not part
of my job description. The assignment was given to me by Bruce Squires
and I attempted to watch, and report on the level of the lake.
It is to be noted that I am not an engineer, nor do I know what is an
appropriate level for the lake.
The additional duties were performed without complaint, and
without asking for more remuneration.
- 4 When Jann Vasey came on board, I was so delighted to have a wonderful
new boss, that ^ p e r f o r m e d the extra and additional duties with
w i l l i n g n e s s : T^hey were as follows:
(i) To be present, and make rounds, even though the maintenance
was on location.

crew

(ii) Saturday mornings were added to my duties, which was something
1 had not bargained for, when I agreed to work for Darrell.

- 5 When the rash of increased vandalism came to Monroe, partly because
of the decreased man-hours worked by the men, my duties were increased
as f o l l o w s :
(i)

Rounds Qyery

two hours (compare the original contract with

Darrell)

(ii ) Rounds even though the maintenance crew is here (compare the
original contract with D a r r e l l . )
I performed these extra duties, out of deference for Jann, who is a
good man to work for. Other reasons are that I am happy here, that I
like the privacy, the quiet, that I am not scared cf being alone on the
plant and that I have great concern for Monroe and its activities

A further rash of bad vandalism and destruction on plant property '
in the Fall, 1985, resulted in a discussion between Jann Vasey and I,
during which I was asked (and I agreed, rather u n w i l l i n g l y ) - - to make
rounds every hour. I did this right until the fog and the bad weather
came. When the good weather returned, (second week in Jan. 1986) I resum
my rounds EVERY TWO HOURS.
-

7 -

IT IS NOW FOUR YEARS since I was hired as security guard, and I
wish to make a comparison between the original arrangement and
what I am in the habit of doing, each week-end. to Drevent vandalism

With regard to the statement that this is ON FOOT, I am in the
habit of 'jogging each morning, and I jog around the plant, and
to the back of the back pit, and make this my "first round".
(2) 11:00.tJm. Saturdays, and 11:00 a.m. Sundays:
Inspection using the truck. I get out of the truck, where
I find it necessary, to inspect the locks.
NOTE: AFTER MY FIRST ROUND IN THE MORNINGS, COMMON SENSE WOULD
TELL US THAT my chief concern would be the presence of people
and the presence of damage or vandalism occurring since the
previous round.
(3) 1:00 p.m. Sundays, and Saturdays:
SIMILAR ROUNDS, -- including inspection of back pit and
all machinery therein.
(4) Mid-afternoons Saturdays, and Sunday$:
Same as (3)
(5)

DUSK (I go by my calendar which giyes the precise time
for the sun to set and I gauge my round for DUSK).
SIMILAR ROUNDS.

(6) EVENINGS: Saturdays, Sundays.

FINAL ROUNDS.

During the week-end of the bad vandalism, breakage of the candy
machines, etc. 'I was prepared, because of the good weather and
thaw, for renewed attempts at vandalism.
I maintain having followed the plan outlined on bottom of page (2)
and continued above, and I maintain having looked in at the back
of the office, where the time-clock is.
It is evident there is a discrepancy between my assumed activities
and the time discovered at which the time-clock stopped.
It is my habit to park the truck over the scales, and to head
for the front door of the front office, and to look inside.
Although I am remiss in not having reported the vandalism of the
night before until the following day, there is a possibility the
time clock could have been tampered with and altered by someone
who knew how to do this.
I repeat, my CHIEF CONCERN, after checking locks, is to look out'
for people, and to prevent vandals from entering. To be accused
of making a false report and of lying is something absolutely
unacceptable to me and I request to be cleared immediately.
To balk at a delayed report is to miss the entire purpose of
my presence as Security Guard.
I reported that I had made rounds at 5:30 p.m. prior to discovering
the damage at 7:00 p.m. I maintain the fact that I did look in
on the back of the office, and this was presumably Saturday,
but not Sunday, == since vou claim that thp t im^-rinr\t rsTTTc

PaGE (4) MEMO
If I am to work on this problem with Monroe, and resolve the
threat'of constant vandalism, I wish to regain immediate good faith
and be cleared Immediately of the accusation of having Ilea to y o u ,
concerning the time of the damage.
This document is presented to Monroe, with the statement that I
know I have performed my duties as security guard according to
my work agreement with Jann, and that such agreements were over and abo\
the duties for which I was hired by Darrell Williams.
I do not accept the blame for the damage that was done last week-end
and would have you consider a former problem of semantics.
In the DRAFT of this report, written and submitted to Jann and
Stan Wilson on Tuesday morning, I stated "I take no responsibility
for the acts of vandalism which have occurred."

IT IS MOST EVIDENT the above statement has made Jann see red and
my mention of the word semanticsto M r . Tidwell did not seem to
make sense. At a later conversation with Jann, I altered my statement
until it translated into: "I cannot accept the blame" and at that
moment, Jann understood what I was trying to say, and I presume M r . Tid'
would, also.
As far as "blame" is concerned, there can be none placed on me when
I perform my duties according to the way they were designated.
But as regards "responsibility" I feel so terribly responsible
for the maintenance of safety at Monroe that I have lived through
several days, -- and several sleepless nights since the incident,
feeling as if it<was I who actually and physically performed this
terrible, and crazy damage .
My own home was burglarized in Fall, 1984 during daylight hours.
Although several men saw a red bronco parked by my door they
made no attempt to find out who it w a s . . . . . (I make the statement
and I do not blame anyone for this.)
Since that time, I have taken personal measures to secure my home.,
(f tnt
(

On my drafted report, I strongly suggested that Monroe should
take similar measures and install a burglar alarm.
I cannot
be present at the office for 24 hours.
As the damage of last week-end was done after 9:30 p.m. I
want to point out that I was not requested to make late-night
rounds. It is now evident that my presence and my vigilance
needs to be extended into t h e night, and I am presenting a
very informal proposal to Jann Vasey and Stan Wilson, to try to
resolve the problems.
I have a strong desire to remain with your Company, even after
Cottonwood closes. I feel I have served you well, and over
and above the original requirements.
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TO: Monroe
ATTENTION:
FROM:
DATE:

J a m , with a copy tc Mr. Stan T'"ilson

Mrs. M. Timmie Sidwell,
Guard, Cottonwood Flant, Monroe.
Submitted Friday, January 2k, 1986

SUBJECT:

Some informal thoughts about revised security guard
schedule.

INTRODUCTION
This document is the result of extensive research and
investigation. All conversations have been held in confidence and the security problems of Monrolc have not
been divulged.
I request a reciprocal professionalism from Monroe personnel
in the handling of this document and shall be willing to
negotiate with Jann Vasey, Stanton Wilson only. I am open
to converse with Mr. Parry, Doug Clark — or with Frank
Metcalfe to discuss statistical facts in my feasibility
study.
Circulation of this document should be restricted to the
above-mentioned persons. Please do not make extra copies
without my permission.
We are attempting to resolve a serious problem, and it
can best be done by applying mutual respect for the dignity
(... and the feelings ...) of all concerned.
I am keeping the reputation of Monroe well in mind and I
expect reciprocal consideration from all v^ith whom I deal.
•

*

*

I suggest this document be weighed against1 the other documents
I am submitting to you, namely:"(i) a feasibility study examining
the financial worth of the present security guard services, and
(ii) A revised edition of the draft memorandum presented to
Jann Vasey and Mr. Stan Wilson, on Tuesday 1/21/86.
The suggestions made in this document describe what I feel I
can offer over and above my present work schedule. They
are not a committment on my part, at this time.

Page (2) security guard schedule.
WORK TO BE CONTRACTED ON A FULL-TIME BASIS
The work is to be considered full time on the following days:
(1) Saturdays
(2) Sundays
(3) Legal holidays
(4) Any other times about which guard would be
notified in advance.
ALL WORK TO BE RECORDED
No part of this work would remain unrecorded. Guard would
require a time-card with check-ins, check-outs. The hourly
pay would be evaluated separate, distinct and above Mrs.
Sidwell's present monthly salary. It would, in fact, differ
from week to week but follow the general pattern of an 8-hour,
12-hour or 1^-hour working day.
MONROC'S MODE OF PAYMENT
Your mode of payment would be. according to your decision, but
there would be two parts (2) to Mrs. Sidwell's remuneration, as follows:
(1) Continuance of her present remuneration.
(2) Additional hourly rate agreed upon.
EXTENT OF RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY GUARD
To remain the same as the contractual agreement made in February, 1982
with Darrell Williams.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES TO BE DETERMINED
These additional responsibilities will bear their separate responsibility category, aside from the February, 1982, agreement.
*

*

#

THE NEEDS OF MONROC
Monroe, Cottonwood, needs active, patrolled coverage for all daylight
hours (1) 8 to 12 hours in winter and (2) 12 to 1^ hours in summer.
COORDINATION OF THIS NEED
Coordination of this need must be made with the availability
of the present security personnel, namely Mrs. Sidwell.
However, past damage and vandalism demonstrates the necessity
for constant patrolling.
SUGGESTED JOB DESCRIPTION
(l) Rounds made in the Monroe truck every 2 (two) hours.
NOTE: "As each round takes approximately 30 minutes,
with stops at each point specified (there are 8 to
12 of these), hourly rounds would imply constant
running of the truck.
Please consider this factor, and come up with your
decisions.
(1) —

A:

ALTERNATIVE:
Rounds made very 90 minutes could be considered.

PagS (3) security guard schedule.
SUGGESTED JOB DESCRIPTION, (continued)
(2) SATURDAYS
The requirements of Monroe are 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
fall and winter, with original guard duties on top of this
in the evenings. 'These duties would reiiain as set in 1982.
The requirements would increase when summer comes.
(3) SUNDAYS
Same as (2)
(*0 HOLIDAYS
Same as (2)
(5)

DUTIES OF SECURITY GUARD
(to fall as part of "jc^b
description")
(5) The duties of the Guard would be as follows:
Rounds and surveillance at specied designated points:
(i) Office, two doors
(ii) Cement plant (Tey's office, upstairs at back)
(iii) Chemical lab (upstairs) -- the doprs facing west
(iv) Tool shed
(v) Large grease shop
(vi) Extreme back gravel pit. — to inspect machinery and
prevent vandalism
(vii) Metal shed (grease shop) close tc warming hut.

THE SALT LAKE CITY "SECURITY MARKET"
AVAILABLE SERVICES
I have called four security companies, without Identifying Monroe
or giving my name, to request rates and conditions.
INFORMATION SHARED
I provided the following information:
(1) ^0 to 50 acres of property with obstructed visibility
to outlying parts.
(2) Machinery at outlying parts of the property
(3) Fenced in, with locked gates, but easy for people to enter.
(k) Number of surveillance points, buildings etc. 8 to 12
buildings, or more, with locks at specific points.
SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS

page
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SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS (continued from page (3) )
(1) Three, out of the four manages of security companies
said it was not possible for one person to (a) properly
patrol ^0 to 50 acres and 7 to 10 buiMngs, and (b)
expect to deter the vandalism problems.
(NOTE: I think this will will clauify what I have been saying
to Monroe for one year, now, that"I cannot be held responsible.,
if damage occurs with the part-time security guard arrangements
during daylight hours, when no men are at the plant.)
(2) The minimum hours offered by any one of these four security
companies is 4 hours, (one company)-, at a rate of $6.50
or more per hour.
The others have a minimum of 8 hours at either $6.50 minimum,
$6.00 or/(and) $5.95.
None of them offered cheaper rates for 12-1^ hours.
(3) The understood conditions were that Guard has responsibility of
company vehicle. Guard is unarmed. Whether he patrols, or stays
put, the rate runs at a minimum of $5*95 up to minimum $6.50
and he receives a wage of at least $^.50 per hour. .
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

PROPOSAL
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The following services offered by Mrs Sidwell to Monroe on a
full-time basis for certain days are:
(1) Subject to change
(2) Must adhere to all conditions on page (l) and all other
stipulations which precede this proposal.
HOURS

©
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Due to Monroe's needs, which change according to daylight,
<H U
season, weather and operation of plant — these hours are subject £ <$
to change:
•gj )csl
•H 00
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MRS SIDWELL s PROPOSAL
o 2^ <\
HOURS: Saturdays: 9*.30 to 5:30 full time, followed by resumption of j
JOB DESCRIPTION: As stated on pages: [2) and (3) of this document.
Sundays:

Noon to 12:30 until 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. full time,
followed by resumption of original duties, as per
February, 1982 contract.

Holidays:

The work shall be full time, eight (8) hours,
with no exceptions.
HOURS: Your choice of hours, either start 9:30 continue to
5J 30 or start 10:30, continue to 6: 30.... or other.
DUTIES FOR ALL THREE CATEGORIES, Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays:
As previously suggested and described on pp. 2 and 3, with

Page (5) security guard schedule
Notes on guard's extraterritorial activities:
BEFORE EXAMINING THE SUBJECT OF REMUNERATION f( WE NEED TO
CONSIDER THE GUARD AS A HUMAN BEING AND BE INFORMED OF THE
FOLLOWING:
(1) I attend the Episcopal Church on Sunday roomings occasionally.
I request the autonomy of continuing with) this habit. A full-time
day is eight hours. I have therefore proposed my services to
you from noon to eight, on Sundays.
(1) —

(A) I would suggest you hire security for Sunday mornings
to remain on the property until about noon. I may be home,
and I may be gone. I commit myself to fulfill my original
duties, being that, of:
"one round Sunday mornings,
one round Sunday noon."

(1) —

(B) I would suggest any security personnel you hire be based
at the front office, and make his/her rounds in the truck, as
I do.
,
My personal problem with finding a substitute is that I do
not care for a stranger to come into my home.

(2)

Saturdays. Evenings:
I am a member of the Utah Symphony Association and volunteer
my services to this organization. I attend the Symphony occasionally on Saturdays at 8.
I commit myself to fulfill my original duties, for Saturdays,
being that I make a round last thing at night, if I go out.

(3)

The initial agreement made in 1982 gave leeway for theater
and symphony concerts. At that time, the night crew was
working every night.

PLEASE CONSIDER THESE POSSIBLE ABSENCES VERY CAREFULLY. ANY
COMMITMENT I SHALL MAKE TO MONROC AT THIS TIME, WOULD BE MADE
WITH THE CERTAINTY THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO ADHERE TO THE COMMITMENT
WITHOUT CONSTANT CHANGES AND RENEGOCIATIONS.
Proposed resolution of possible problem
I think, when I absent myself in the evenings, at week-ends or
on week-nights when the night maintenance crew is not here, that
I should report to Jann with a phone call to his home, informing
him of my absence before it occurs.

Page (6) security guard schedule
REMUNERATION
After extensive study, conversations with specialists, executives
and others, it has become evident to me that my committment as
to hours of full-time work will eventually have to be shared with
another party, if Monroe is to receive adequate coverage. This
will become evident in summer. Although I am responsible for my
duties as resident guard, summer-time will bring about a grey area
— margin between daylight and night hours, -- a margin extending
into 12 to 1^-hour days, when I cannot commit myself to full-time
commitments.
EXCHANGEABLE DUTIES
My remuneration for full-time work must be sufficient for me to
be able to call in a substitute, full-time guard, (presumably for
hours extended beyond eight (8) ).
REMUNERATION
Any agreed-upon remuneration will be negotiable , and be decided
after considering all the information provided, from all my sources
and reasearch.
It is evident that the remuneration of a substitute guard should
match mine.
Alternatives To request one of the men to sit in the office to
perform extended surveillance after any period of 8 hours.
GUARDfs ACCESS TO TELEPHONE
I must have immediate access for the purpose of notifying Police.
Please provide me with a key to the office.
Alternative
I would prefer to have a 250 piece (quarter) hidden somewhere
so as to have access to the pay phone at back of office.
Returning to my mobile home to use the telephone would be the
same as letting any present vandals slip away.

: Monroe
OM: Mrs. M. Timmie Sidwell
Security Guard,
Cottonwood plant.
TE 24 January 1986
SUBJECT:

Analysis:
Estimated dollar value of my
present total w o r k - h o u r s .

ESUMPTION:
is understood by all concerned that any hours during which Security

Guard

expected to be on location should be given some financial value.
STRUCTURE OF THIS ANALYSIS

)

First a summary of the job description
This job description is in five c a t e g o r i e s : ( A ) , ( B ) , ( C ) , (D) and (E)

)

Second, each category is evaluated in man h o u r $ .
These man hours are stated on a weekly and on a monthly basis
)

Third, the dollar value of each category is presented, first by the
hour, then by the week, and finally by the month.

ECIAL NOTE:
e resulting figures are for the purpose of comparison with my present
nthly salary; not for the purpose of argument or complaint concerning
id present salary.
-

1 -

iB DESCRIPTION, MONROC SECURITY GUARD, COTTONWOOD

PLANT

JEGORY (A)

To be present on location each night of the week.

JEGORY (B)

To be present on location

JEGORY (C)
JEGORY (D)
JEGORY

(E)

* ( i ) Saturday afternoons
(or Whenever men are not working,
and no-one is there)
(ii) All day Sunday
(iii) On specified holidays
To lock the gates each night, first Checking that everyone
has left the plant.
To make rounds three times per day, Maximum, on days designated in (B) (above). To evict trespassers and to make reports
on the activity to the plant foreman after any incidents.
Presumption:

That t h e g u a r d

live

oh p r e m i s e s .

lysis of man hours EGORY (E) -- continued:
It is to be noted that this final condition implies
the presence of my possessions and my valuables on location;
it implies a vulnerability similar to that experienced by
Monroe, with its assets on the plant.
It is to be noted that my property is subject to similar
wear and tear, corrosion by the immediate elements and the dust
such as is present in a ^supra-ordinary circumstance; a gravel
plant.
- 2 'EGORY (A)
"EGORY (B)

TEGORY (C)
FEGORY (D)

The hourly evaluation for this category is
7 days of twelve hours, a normal night-time
when I am expected to be on location.
The hourly evaluation of this category is
Saturdays, 6 hours, Sundays 12, hours, and
the average weekly hours for 10 holidays
per year, being 2 1/2 hours per week . . . . .

WEEKLY HOURS
84 hours

20 1/2

TOTAL FOR CATEGORIES (A) and (B) 104 1/2 hrs
To lock gates each night . .
( w e e k l y ) : . . . 1 3/4 hrs.
To make rounds 3 times per day at week-ends,
5 , /2 h
and once at night during the week . . .(weekly)
'
To make reports and submit them. . . . (weekly)
20 minutes
TOTAL FOR CATEGORIES (C) and (D)
7 hours 50 mins

TEG0RY (E)
tangible defrayments such as "he interest on my mobile home, the exposure to
st and the exposureof my person to the noise of machinery 5 days per week
rely has some financial equivalent. As it cannot be evaluated, it could
set off against the expense incurred by Monroe for lights and heat.
- 3 n proceeding to place a dollar value for each category of man-hours stated in
ove, I have taken, first minimum wage.
he minimum wage is the legal rate of remuneration.
.econd, I have taken $2.00 per hour because this is the rate paid to a
ibysitter who sleeps with the children when the parents are away. The
itionale for this is that, about twice during a 12-month period would
lere be a need for the babysitter to encounter and deal with an emergency,
milarly, the security guard at Monroe is there (as per the request of
)nroc) for the purpose of emergencies.
u r d , I have taken the extreme minimum dollar value you could place upon
I mandatory presence on location -- namely, $1:00 per hour.
FURTHER NOTES ON

- 3 -

lis type of analysis is useless unless the alternatives are kept well in mind:
n my case, the alternative presented is that, as an autonomous human being, I

ysis of man hours

tain the choice to be away from home some nights, sometimes overnight
some week-ends; to go to the mountains some Sundays.
I took on the job of security guard, I was awar^ that this would be
ailed, and I made the choices accordingly. However, for this very
on, it is presumed that my presence on location has some financial value,
at times when I am not physically working, or making rounds.
RTANT:

Once again, nothing in the above paragraph is intended as a
complaint, but rather as a further analysis of the value
of man-hours.

w proceed to apply a minimum wage upon the total 104 1/2 hours,
to apply a value of $2.00 per hour upon the total 104 1/2 hours
then finally, a value of $1.00 per hour upon this total 104 1/2 hours,
ol lows:
3.35

TOTAL WEEKLY
$350.07

TOTAL MONTHLY
$1.400.2|8

2.00

209.00

836.qO

1.00

104.50

418.00

FOR CATEGORIES (A) anc
(B;

(see footnote (1))

ineration

for categories

(C) and (D)

'ou will refer back to page ( 1 ) , Section - 1 - yoij will see that
;e categories involve physical work, surveillance^ rounds, etc. etc,
\ placing a total worth upon these hours of $5.75 per hour.
ten give a choice between subtracting from said $$.75
the minimum wage included into the total wage for 1041/2hours
Subtracting the $2.00 which was estimated as an alternative
:c) The $1.00 per hour.
(SEE pAQE (4) }
TN0TE (from above;:
The figure of $418.00 per month is the closest to what I am now earning
and covers remuneration for my presence only at s 1.00 per hour. It constitute
no remuneration whatsoever for active guard duties.

Analysis of man hours
(4)

BASE VALUE FOR ACTIVE GUARD DUTY:

$5.75:

5.75 less 3.35 for 7 hours 50 minutes

TOTAL WEEKLY
$18.80

TOTAL MONTHLY
$72.50

5.75 less $2.00 for 7 hours 50 minutes

29.37

117.48

5.75 lessl.OO per hour for 7 hours 50 minutes.

37.21

148.84

(Your choice for totals above, depends upon
your financial evaluation of my basic
hours on location).
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TOTALS
Add categories A, B, C, and D as per your one
choice out of the three choices given to
assess hours on location, my total financial
worth to Monroe under the present job description
totals to $565.84 per month using the minimum of
$1.00 per hour for my total number of hours on
location., _ * _ + „ „ + „ f0\\
Other figures below,
(see footnote (2);
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SUMMARY
Without considering the intangible advantages and disadvantages
stated in Section (E) which, according to our previous conversations
are supposed to balance out your contribution to lights and heat, the mean
figure (going exactly between maximum figures) is a monthly $1021.16
(... and note, I do NOT use the word "salary" for fear you will interpret
this analysis as a complaint).
Respectfully

subm

immie

Security,
Cottonwood plant.

(2) Weekly total using minimum wage is $368.87 per week
and, using $2.00 base, $238.37.

(3) I am attaching a scratch-sheet of figures to this page.
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MONROC, INC.
1730 BECK STREET / P.O. BOX 537
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110
(801) 359-3701

January 28, 1986

Ms, Timmie Sidwell
P. 0. Box 521034
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152
Dear Ms. Sidwell:
Monroe, Inc, has decided to discontinue the use of your
services in the security function at the Cottonwood Heights Plant.
As per our agreement, Monroe is to give you a 30 day notice
of its wishes to discontinue the agreement. However, because Df
the present inclement weather and in fairness to you, Monroe will
extend this period for you to remove your trailer and personal
possessions until March 31, 1986. If for any reason you wish to
leave before that time, please feel free to do so.
This decision is final and we appreciate your services in the
past years.
Sincerely,
MONROC, INC.

Jan Vasey
Manager s

E! Wilson
Vice-President
SEWrba
cc: Robert A. Parry

